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MOTION PICTURE PIRACY IN CHINA:
RATED ARRRGH!
I. INTRODUCTION

O

nce viewed by many cultures as the sincerest form of flattery,
copying is now universally considered an unforgivable crime.1 In
fact, copyright theft has become “the largest irritant in the [multi-billion
dollar] annual commercial relationship between the United States and
China,”2 accounting for a loss of nearly $250 million in revenue in the
United States each year. Blame it on Confucius.3 Blame it on poverty.4
Blame it on ignorance.5 Blame it on a weak police force.6 No matter how
you spin it, the excuses boil down to the same basic tenet: copyright infringement is a serious problem in China and it is having an even more
1. See K.C. Swanson, The China Challenge, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 12, 2005.
2. US Disputes China’s Anti-Piracy Success, TAIPEI TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 11.
3. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China
in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 131, 165 (2000); K.C. Swanson, supra
note 1 (explaining that in Chinese history, copying had a positive connotation, especially
in the arts, and under Communism people were taught to share their resources). See also
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 29 (1995) (explaining that in ancient Chinese
civilization, copying was indicative of one’s appreciation for the work of a particular
author; copying “bore witness to the quality of the work copied and to its creator’s degree
of understanding and civility.”).
4. Eunice Yoon, U.S. Shoemaker Faces Chinese ‘Gall Factor,’ CNN.COM, May 19,
2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/05/19/eyeonchina.fakes/index.html
(“The [Chinese] government is hamstrung by its desire to keep its 1.3 billion people employed to maintain social order,” explained Harley Lewin, a New York intellectual property lawyer representing New Balance in a lawsuit.).
5. See Seth Faison, China Turns Blind Eye to Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
1998, at D1 (discussing that Chinese storeowners and consumers often do not realize the
implication that piracy is criminal. One storeowner defended herself saying, “There’s
nothing wrong with selling pirated VCD’s. My son loves watching them.”).
6. William Pesek, Jr., Chinese Counterfeiting Hurts China, Too, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., May 17, 2005 (explaining that local authorities often protect counterfeiters because
they provide local jobs and that police are neither effective nor do they have budgets to
enforce the law). See also Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intell. Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm., (2005) (statement of Eric H. Smith, President, Int’l Intell. Prop. Alliance (IIPA)) (explaining that “unlike in the 1980s and 1990s,
the problem [of piracy] has less to do with inadequate laws and more with the ineffective
and non-deterrent enforcement systems”); Kathleen E. McLaughlin & Christopher S.
Rugaber, U.S., Chinese Trade Officials Make Progress on IPR, Market Access, but Stall
on Textiles, Int’l Trade Rep., July 14, 2005, at 1162; Neil Graham, Senate Panel Highlights Scourge of IP Piracy in Russia and China, Int’l Trade Rep., June 9, 2005, at 936;
IIPA, 2005 Special 301 Report: People’s Republic of China (PRC) (2005), available at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2005/2005SPEC301PRCrev.pdf [hereinafter Special 301 Report].
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serious impact on American industries, particularly the motion picture
industry. In fact, the motion picture industry faces a 95 percent piracy
rate in China each year, which means that 95 percent of all American
home videos and films7 sold in China are illegal copies.8
The Chinese economy, in turn, has become dependent upon revenues
from piracy, thus fueling its popularity.9 Some estimates attribute about
one-third of China’s GDP to piracy and counterfeiting.10 The profits are
so great that many pirates, akin to drug dealers,11 will take huge risks to
attain them and do not see anything wrong with their acts.12 And while
7. See, e.g., PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF THE BLACK PEARL (Walt
Disney Productions 2003); PETER PAN (Walt Disney Productions 1953); HOOK (Columbia Pictures 1991); TREASURE ISLAND (Walt Disney Productions 1950); THE GOONIES
(Warner Brothers 1985).
8. See Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intell.
Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm., (2005) (statement of Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA) (explaining that between 1998 and 2004 the legitimate home video market in China represented about 5 percent of the estimated total $1.3 billion market); Economic Worth of the
Copyright Industries: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong.
4 (2004) (statement of Jack Valenti, President and CEO, Motion Pictures Association of
America (MPAA)), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/Valenti
Testimony040609.pdf.
9. Henry Blodget, How to Solve China’s Piracy Problem: A Dozen Ideas, Maybe
One Will Work, SLATE, Apr. 12, 2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2116629/index.html.
10. Id. Not only do DVDs fall victim to counterfeiting in China, but products from
virtually every other sector are also counterfeited, from Ralph Lauren shirts to Callaway
golf clubs to Gucci handbags to Chevy cars. Malini Bawa, Pirating of Intellectual Property by Chinese Businesses is Huge Problem, VOANEWS.COM, Nov. 22, 2005,
http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-11-22-voa61.cfm; China Pirates Conjure Fake
Potter, CNN.COM, Jul. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/BUSINESS/07/31/china.
potter/ap/index.html.
11. Seth Faison, supra note 5, at D1. In his article, Faison compares pirates to drug
dealers and explains that:
[P]rofits are so great, [pirates] will take any risk . . . they’re like drug dealers. It
is very difficult to arrange a crackdown. You have to coordinate all these different departments, the copyright publication department, the Industrial and
Commercial Administration . . . . When it comes to copying a disk, most Chinese people don’t see what’s wrong.
Id. See also Greg Hernandez, China Piracy Costs High; Movies: Counterfeit DVD Sales
Stealing Millions from Studios, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Nov. 22, 2005, at A21
(citing an MPAA study claiming that revenue from piracy reached $512 billion in 2004,
compared with $322 billion from the sale of illegal drugs); Greg Hernandez, It’s Even
Bigger than Drugs: CD, DVD Piracy Makes Billions in China, DAILY NEWS OF LOS
ANGELES, Nov. 22, 2005, at B1 (charging the profit margin for DVD piracy is “exponentially higher” than for drugs).
12. Simon Teng, China’s IP Law Report Card: A Troubled Student?, IPFRONTLINE,
Feb. 15, 2005, http://ipfrontline.com/printtemplate.asp?id=2131 (explaining that the
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the Chinese government does not encourage piracy, current policy—such
as the over-restrictive censure of releases13—and weak law enforcement
do nothing to discourage it.14
But piracy’s boon to the Chinese economy is a threat to the United
States’ economy—or at least to certain sectors of the economy. Notwithstanding the extraordinary rate of piracy in China, Jack Valenti, president
of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), boasts the
United States copyright industries as “America’s greatest trade prize”—
they represent the only sectors to maintain a surplus balance of trade with
every other country in the world.15 The copyright industries—which include motion pictures, music, and books—are intertwined with other aspects of the economy, so their losses16 trickle down into the entirety of
choice to become a pirate is often a “survival decision” due to rampant unemployment
and the scarce number of jobs with livable wages available in China).
13. Official Chinese movie theaters are only permitted to show “clean” movies—
meaning those that have been screened by and approved by the Chinese government.
Further, the government imposes strict limits on the number of foreign films that can be
exhibited in China’s theaters and requires that it be on a revenue-sharing basis. The resulting discrepancy between what the people want to see and what the government allows
them to see has created a highly-trafficked black market for pirated goods. Yingchi Chu,
The Consumption of Cinema in Contemporary China, in MEDIA IN CHINA: CONSUMPTION,
CONTENT, AND CRISIS 43, 53 (Stephanie Hemelryk Donald, Michael Keane, & Yin Hong
eds., 2002); Laikwan Pang, The global-national position of Hong Kong Cinema in China,
in MEDIA IN CHINA: CONSUMPTION, CONTENT AND CRISIS, supra, at 59; Greg Hernandez,
U.S. Studios Urge Crackdown on China’s CD, DVD Pirates, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Nov.
24, 2005, at 23.
14. See Kathleen E. McLaughlin & Christopher S. Rugaber, U.S., Chinese Trade
Officials Make Progress on IPR, Market Access, but Stall on Textiles, Int’l Trade Rep.,
July 14, 2005, at 1162; Greg Hernandez, supra note 13, at 23. Piracy has become such a
competitive market that it has been reported that “Chinese storekeepers who sell fake
DVDs for ten yuan gripe about street vendors selling them for seven. And the street vendors complain about competitors offering two-for-one specials.” Blodget, supra note 9.
15. Alan Story, Don’t Ignore Copyright, the ‘Sleeping Giant’ on the TRIPS and International Educational Agenda, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 125, 129 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds.,
2002).
16. “Losses” per se are very hard to calculate. The people who buy pirated DVDs in
China often do so because they cannot afford to buy genuine products at full price. While
the industry cites that it has lost roughly $280 million per year (compared to the estimated $60 billion losses estimated to all other industries) the industry is not necessarily
losing out on sales to the pirates. See Special 301 Report, supra note 6; James M. Sellers,
The Black Market and Intellectual Property: A Potential Sherman Act Section Two Antitrust Defense?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 583, 605 (2004); Jon Healey & Chuck Philips,
Piracy Spins a Global Web, L. A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005. Andrew Mertha explains in his
book, that the real uneasiness in Hollywood in relation to piracy, is a result of the unsettling notion of “free riding,” whereby “pirates reap profits from manufacturing—and
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the United States’ economy, affecting job availability,17 tax flow, quality
of life for various other businesses, and cash flow for investments.18
These annual revenue losses have the copyright industries so riled up that
they are lobbying for the World Trade Organization (WTO) to take action against China.19
In reality the WTO, by way of its Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement is the kindling fueling many of the
movie industry’s problems. The Agreement suffers from a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and is thereby incapable of providing efficient criminal remedies for the acts of movie pirates. Parts II and III of
this Note examine the flaws inherent in the TRIPS Agreement, focusing
on China’s criminal code and motion picture piracy as illustrations of
where the Agreement went wrong. Part IV suggests that the WTO reinitiate negotiations to amend TRIPS in order to better protect intellectual
property rights; and Part V concludes that the piracy problem is not
likely to be resolved without any WTO intervention, as illustrated by the
drastic measures being taken in self-defense by Hollywood and the
United States’ government.
II. THE TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AGREEMENT
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights20 requires member nations21 to uphold Intellectual Property Rights
consumers enjoy the savings from purchasing—pirated goods that deny the rightholders
their share of remuneration.” ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 19 (Cornell Univ. Press 2005).
17. James M. Sellers, supra note 16, at 605–06 (discussing that the Business Software
Alliance estimated a loss of 44,000 jobs lost directly, and 74,000 jobs through a trickledown effect in 2001, plus a loss of $22 billion in 2001). See also John Malcolm & Lauren
Nguyen, Criminal Prosecution Needed in Movie Piracy Cases, PROSECUTOR, July/Aug.
2005, at 37 (explaining that copyright theft is not a victimless crime because it affects not
only producers but also carpenters, seamstresses, electricians, and other personnel).
18. Malcolm & Nguyen, supra note 17, at 37.
19. Swanson, supra note 1. See infra Part IV (discussing the counter-arguments that
WTO action may not be the right technique to solve the piracy problem).
20. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. TRIPS was
the result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, which took place at
Punta del Este, Uruguay in September 1986 to negotiate fourteen different trade-related
topics including intellectual property. DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:
DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 10−12 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 2003) (1998).
21. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, at Annex 12 (listing the WTO Members as of
January 1, 2002), reprinted in GERVAIS, supra note 20.
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(IPR) and enforce their nation’s civil and criminal laws governing IPR.22
In general, the TRIPS Agreement sets out minimum standards for IPR
protection,23 basic principles of enforcement,24 and means for dispute
settlement through the WTO that each member country must abide.25
Initially entered into force in January 1996 as a compilation of and addition to the Berne and Paris Conventions,26 the TRIPS Agreement was
referred to as an intellectual property milestone because it was the first
agreement to create detailed rules, in the form of universal minimum
standards, in the area of IPR enforcement.27 Idealists who look to the
22. Abdulqawi A. Yusuf, TRIPs: Background, Principles and General Provisions, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 3, 11
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
23. The importance of the agreement is that it:
[S]ets these standards by requiring, first, that the substantive obligations of the
main conventions of the WIPO, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention) in their most recent
versions, must be complied with . . . . Secondly, the TRIPS Agreement adds a
substantial number of additional obligations on matters where the pre-existing
conventions are silent or were seen as being inadequate. The TRIPS Agreement
is thus sometimes referred to as a Berne and Paris-plus Agreement.
WTO
Intellectual
Property—Overview
of
TRIPS
Agreement,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter Overview of TRIPS].
24. Id. (“[E]nforcement contains provisions on civil and administrative procedures
and remedies, provisional measures, special requirements related to border measures and
criminal procedures which specify, in a certain amount of detail, the procedures and
remedies that must be available so that right holders can effectively enforce their
rights.”).
25. Id.
26. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27
(1986). Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last revised at the
Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583; 828 U.N.T.S. 303.
27. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 3. In his book, Gervais writes:
[The scope of TRIPS] is in fact much broader than that of any previous international agreement, covering not only all areas already (sometimes only partly)
protected under extant agreements, but also giving new life to treaties that
failed and protecting for the first time rights that did not benefit form any multilateral protection. In addition, and some would say perhaps more importantly
than its broad coverage, the TRIPS Agreement enshrined detailed rules on one
of the most difficult and, for rights holders, painful aspects of intellectual property rights: enforcement.
See also Maria Strong, Copyright Enforcement: Basic Considerations and Strategies to
Protect Copyrights Abroad, in INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS:
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WTO to solve the global problem of IPR violations view TRIPS as
“not only a trade agreement, [but] also a multifaceted project to export to
all corners of the globe a particular set of values and presumptions about
the need to protect both ideas and the expression of those ideas . . . .”28 It
follows that the TRIPS Agreement was drafted to effectively protect IPR
while encouraging international trade, not burdening it.29
TRIPS endeavors to achieve these results through two basic principles:
national treatment and most favored nation status. National treatment
requires that members treat their own citizens the same as citizens of
other Member States with respect to IPR enforcement, while most favored nation status provides equal treatment under domestic laws, preventing one member country from getting a ‘better deal’ on IPR than
another or one Member State from receiving unfair advantages over another.30
Members to the TRIPS Agreement are required to implement criminal
sanctions for “willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy31 carried out on a commercial scale.”32 In other words, TRIPS seeks to punish
ENFORCEMENT AND MANAGEMENT 61, 64 (John T. Masterson ed., 2004) (explaining that
the Agreement is often referred to as “Berne-plus” which indicates that TRIPS raised the
minimum standards set in the Berne Agreement).
28. Story, supra note 15, at 129. See also Understanding the WTO—Intellectual
Property: Protection and Enforcement, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
tif_e/agrm7_e.htm (explaining that TRIPS is an attempt to unify IPR protection while
simultaneously striking a balance between the long-term benefits of creation and invention with the short-term costs of protection mechanisms to society).
29. Overview of TRIPS, supra note 23.
30. See John T. Masterson, Jr., Enforcement of Trademarks and Copyrights under the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS: ENFORCEMENT AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 27, at 2–3; J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPs Component of the WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 21, 25 (Carlos M. Correa
& Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998).
31. International Chamber of Commerce Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau, Enforcement Measures Against Counterfeiting and Piracy: An International Survey, at x
n.21 [hereinafter Survey]. This survey indicates that the TRIPS Agreement defines pirated copyright goods as:
[A]ny goods which are copies made without the consent of the right holder or
person duly authorized by him in the country of production and which are made
directly or indirectly from an article where the making of that copy would have
constituted an infringement of a copyright or a related right under the law of the
country of importation.
32. Id. at xv. The TRIPS Agreement also creates civil and administrative policies and
laws relating to IPR; the focus of this Note is the criminal aspect of TRIPS.
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and deter people profiting from the business of piracy.33 Under Article
61(1) of TRIPS, the punishments imposed by a Member State against a
copyright violator34 must be comparable to the penalties for similar
crimes under the national law of the WTO member concerned and must
respect Article 41(1) of TRIPS,35 which obliges Member States to put
forth their best efforts to prevent infringement and to provide expeditious
remedies to prevent and deter future infringements.36
Actual enforcement of IPR in Member States in order to inflict these
penalties upon pirates, however, is difficult to achieve. Although WTO
members are required to enact statutes that conform to TRIPS, the
Agreement does not include specific mechanisms or detailed rules governing the application of such provisions. Further, TRIPS requires sanctions relative to those for other similar crimes—a rather undefined standard—which yields inconsistent results among the member nations. Article 41(5) plainly states that “nothing in this Part creates any obligation
with respect to the distribution of resources as between enforcement of
[IPR] and the enforcement of law in general.”37 The Article elaborates
that members need not implement a separate judicial system to enforce
IPR.38 As a result, a member nation can easily skimp out on providing
maximum enforcement of their IPR laws by claiming it does not have
enough resources to do the job.39 As a WTO Agreement, disputes arising
under TRIPS may be resolved through WTO procedures40 such as a dispute settlement panel, review by the Appellate Body, or cross-retaliation
33. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20.
34. Id. art. 61 (explaining that the TRIPS Agreement not only covers issues relating to
copyright rights. The TRIPS Agreement covers the areas of intellectual property including copyright and related rights, trademarks including service marks, geographical indications including applications of origin; industrial designs; patents, including the protection
of new varieties of plants; the layout-designs of integrated circuits; and undisclosed information including trade secrets and test data).
35. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 327. See also Overview of TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 23 (noting that enforcement must be in accordance with particular rules. Governments must ensure that IPR can be enforced under their laws and that the penalties for
infringement are tough enough to deter further violations. The procedures must be fair
and equitable, but at the same time they may not be unnecessarily complicated or costly.
For example, they must not include unreasonable time limits or unwarranted delays.).
36. Masterson, supra note 30, at 8–9.
37. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 41(5).
38. Id. art. 41(5).
39. See infra Part III (explaining the impact this has on China and, analogously, other
developing countries).
40. See Masterson, supra note 30, at 3 (explaining that this is governed by Article 22
of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes).
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by Member States,41 these procedures are rarely—if ever—used. As of
2004, such WTO mechanisms had never been used to combat the inadequate enforcement of IPR.42
Further complicating the implementation process is the caveat that the
private parties, such as individual authors, artists, producers, or interest
groups (e.g., the MPAA), who are most likely to see their rights directly
violated and to feel the effects of an IPR violation, cannot enforce the
TRIPS Agreement.43 Instead they must make complaints through government channels with access to settlement procedures.44 The United
States, for example, provides such an option through section 301 of the
1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. This Act allows any interested person to “file a petition with the United States Trade Representative (USTR) requesting it take action to enforce the United States’
rights under a trade agreement or to prevent unreasonable foreign trade
practices.”45 Upon such a request, the USTR will investigate the allegations made in the individual’s petition or explain the decision not to investigate.46 Then, the USTR may initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings against a foreign country it has identified as having serious IPR
deficiencies that warrant increased attention to particular problem areas
or practices under the auspices of Special 301.47 Because such efforts are
time consuming and onerous, they do not provide an effective tool for
deterring piracy or punishing it. The United States has been particularly
wary about pursuing WTO procedures against China for fear of straining
the relationship between the two countries.48 Specifically, China and the
United States have an interdependent trading partnership whereby the
41. Id. at 4 (explaining that Article 6 of TRIPS limits dispute settlement to concerning
the “exhaustion of intellectual property rights” to violations of the national agreement and
most favored nation obligations).
42. Masterson, supra note 30, at 6–7.
43. Only members to an agreement may enforce its provisions unless expressly provided for otherwise. In the case of the WTO, the only members are States, not individuals. See generally TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, passim.
44. Survey, supra note 31, at xvi.
45. Id. at xvii.
46. Id.
47. Masterson, supra note 30, at 18–20 (referencing section 182 of the Trade Act of
1974, under which the USTR may identify countries that deny adequate protection of IPR
or deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons that rely upon IP protection. It is
under Special 301, however, that the USTR has power to designate countries to the Priority Watch List.); Yu, supra note 3, at 128–29 (referring to the Special 301 as the “Hbomb of trade policy” because it is a dramatic measure aiming to completely eliminate
unfair trade practices, while allowing the United States to impose sanctions upon countries it finds threatening to its economic progress).
48. See Yu, supra note 3.
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United States absorbs nearly a third of China’s exports and China is the
fifth largest market for U.S. exports.49 Similarly, the United States depends upon Chinese cooperation to peacefully resolve potential tensions
involving Taiwan, Hong Kong, and North Korea.50
Ultimately, as evidenced by the sky-high rate of copyright infringement around the world, sufficient enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement
is sorely lacking.51 No matter how closely a country aligns its own laws
with the standards of the TRIPS Agreement, the rate of piracy and respect for IPR will be difficult to improve without significant changes to
the Agreement itself.52
III. CASE STUDY: CHINA
Russia and China are the biggest thieving countries. If they wanted to
take care of their IP problems, they could. They don’t belong in the
WTO unless they do. Hopefully, they’re watching, because we mean
business.
Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Intellectual Property of the Senate Judiciary Committee53
There is a tendency to build unrealistic expectations regarding China’s
ability to enforce policy. In particular, there is a propensity to oversimplify the issue and place the blame for failure squarely at the feet of
China’s national leadership.
Andrew Mertha, author of The Politics of Piracy54

49. See Id.
50. Id. at 17; Swanson, supra note 1.
51. Masterson, supra note 30, at 6. Motion picture piracy rates are high in countries
around the globe, not just in China. See, e.g., Myron Brilliant, Vice President, East Asia,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Views on China’s Intellectual Property Record, Testimony
Before the House Judicial Subcommittee on the Internet and Intellectual Property (May
17, 2005), available at http://www.uschamber.com/NR/rdonlyres/ehmj5rnmn43vyr73f
e5rdh6xpyowlsuk6ochwrqheq65rtcttlsxeovg4rdxytjcgjzbxv23df2uo44tcwhl7jhxhrd/Hous
eJudiciaryChinatestimonyMay172005revised.doc (the rate in Russia is 80 percent); Carolyn Boyle, View From Here: Copyright Clampdown, LEGAL WEEK GLOBAL, Nov. 24,
2005 (the rate in Malaysia is over 90 percent).
52. Although TRIPS was drafted to reflect the United States’ laws regarding IPR,
piracy is still rampant in this country. For example, on Manhattan’s Canal Street, police
frequently overlook the sale of imitation goods which abundantly impale the market.
MERTHA, supra note 16, at 37–52; Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1381, 1381 (2005).
53. Graham, supra note 6, at 936.
54. Mertha, supra note 16, at 225.
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A. China’s Piracy Problem
Consider a country where Spader-Man (not Spider Man)55 protects the
streets from danger, workout enthusiasts don New Barlun sneakers (as
opposed to New Balance),56 and movie buffs see films months before
their scheduled release,57 and one would not be surprised to learn that
China, one of the largest infringers of copyright rights in the world,58 has
long been the target of pressure from both the United States and the
World Trade Organization to tighten its protection of intellectual property rights.59
However, China is also a country where criminal laws penalizing copyright infringement have been on the books since the early 1990s, a specialized court to prosecute IPR infringement was set up in 1996,60 and a
number of bureaucratic agencies were established to implement the
country’s copyright laws.61 The disparity between the expected result of
China’s bold efforts to protect IPR and the reality of rampant piracy
evokes many questions concerning the effectiveness of Chinese policy,
the seriousness of enforcers, and the root of the problem with Chinese
regulations.
B. China’s Criminal Law Pertaining to Copyright Infringement
For the first time in its millennia-long history, China amended its
criminal law in 1990 to include a provision subjecting serious offenders
of copyright to criminal sanctions such as fines and product confisca-

55. Andrew Frew McMillan, ‘Spader-man’ Prowls Hong Kong’s Streets, CNN.COM,
May 16, 2002, http://archives.cnn.com/2002/BUSINESS/asia/05/15/hk.spaderman/
index.html.
56. Yoon, supra note 4.
57. Swanson, supra note 1.
58. Id.
59. Id. See also ANDREW C. MERTHA, supra note 16, at 37–52 (explaining the longterm negotiations between the United States and China regarding IPR).
60. Jiang Zhipei, Member, Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., Address at the
Int’l Intell. Prop. Inst. Seminar: Recent Developments in China’s Judicial Protection of
Intellectual Property Rights (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/
English/forum/forum33.htm [hereinafter Jiang Zhipei Address].
61. MERTHA, supra note 16, at 133–35 (citing examples of bureaucratic agencies
created to fight piracy, including: the Ministry of Culture Publications Bureau—
originally the Central People’s Government Publishing General Administration—the
National Copyright Administration of the Ministry of Culture, National Publications
Enterprises Management Bureau, National Press and Publications General Administration, and local Copyright Divisions).
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tion.62 Although China was not yet a member of the WTO, it drafted
these criminal laws to conform to the TRIPS requirements.63 While it is
debatable whether this change was made to placate foreign powers fixated on reforming China’s disposition as a threat to copyright holders or
because it hoped to eventually enter into the WTO is debatable, the gesture nevertheless signaled China’s willingness to take IPR seriously and
to change policies that impliedly condoned piracy as a means of economic advancement.64
In its simplest terms, China’s criminal law punishes copyright infringement, for example the reproduction or distribution of a motion picture without the permission of the copyright owner, for the purpose of
making a profit. Where the amount of illegal gains from such infringement is “huge” or there are “situations of serious circumstances,” the
individual infringer is subject to a fixed term of imprisonment of up to
three years and a potential fine.65 However, if the amount of illegal gains
from such infringement is “relatively large” or there are “especially serious circumstances,” the individual infringer is subject to a fixed term of
62. PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 140 (Sweet & Maxwell Asia
2003) (explaining that it took until 1990 for China to amend its criminal law because of
the traditional view in China that intangible property—like a copyright—was not as valuable as tangible property. The author further describes the process by which major laws
are issued by the National People’s Congress (NPC), the supreme legislative body in
China. The NPC is made up of three administrative organs: the State Council, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Supreme People’s Court, and each of these administrative organs may issue binding administrative orders, such as a judicial interpretation
of a law).
63. See Embassy of the United States, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/
copyright.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2005). China first began its “negotiations” over IPR
with the United States in 1979. The new criminal provisions were most likely added in
response to mounting pressure by the USTR, as well as China’s co-signatories of the
Paris Convention on International Trade, who had already become infuriated by China’s
utter disregard for IPR. Andrew Mertha explains further that the United States used the
draft TRIPS Agreement:
[A]s a “carrot” . . . to get China to agree to better protection of U.S. copyright
in China: if China made sufficient progress, according to one US negotiator, the
United States would support China’s bid to be a founding member of the
[WTO]. Thus TRIPS provided a convenient substantive and symbolic link between U.S. IPR concerns and China’s desire to join the WTO.
MERTHA, supra note 16, at 127.
64. Id. at 37–52. See also RONALD C. BROWN, UNDERSTANDING CHINESE COURTS AND
LEGAL PROCESS: LAW WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 6–7 (Kluwer Law Int’l 1997).
65. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979,
amended Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) (P.R.C.).
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imprisonment ranging from three to seven years and/or a potential fine.66
Further, a penalty of up to four years of imprisonment can be mandated
for a person who, for the purpose of making a profit, knowingly sells
motion pictures or video recordings reproduced by infringing upon the
owner’s copyright.67 When one of the above referenced crimes is committed by a unit—rather than an individual—the Code provides that the
unit be punished “in accordance with the provisions of the appropriate
article.”68
Drafted in a somewhat ambiguous and illogical fashion, the provisions’
key terms—for example, “huge” and “relatively large” illegal gains, the
corresponding fines for such gains, and the term “knowingly”—are not
defined. Explanations of these terms were later specified by the Supreme
People’s Court (SPC)69 in the form of judicial interpretations70 of the

66. Id. art 217. Article 217 of the Criminal Law states, in part:
Whoever, for the purpose of making profits, commits any of the following acts
of infringement on copyright shall, if the amount of illegal gains is relatively
large, or if there are other serious circumstances, be sentenced to fixed-term
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also,
or shall only, be fined; if the amount of illegal gains is huge or if there are other
especially serious circumstances, he shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven years and shall also
be fined: (1) reproducing and distributing a . . . motion picture . . . without permission of the copyright owner; . . . (3) reproducing and distributing an audio
or video recording produced by another person without permission of the producer.
Id. Although these are not the only actions that are criminalized, motion pictures are the
relevant medium that will be described for the purpose of this Note.
67. Id. art. 218. Article 218 of the Criminal Law states, in its entirety:
Whoever, for the purpose of making profits, knowingly sells works reproduced
by infringing on the copyright of the owners as mentioned in Article 217 of this
Law shall, if the amount of illegal gains is huge, be sentenced to a fixed-term
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also,
or shall only, be fined.
Id.
68. Id. art. 220. Article 220 of the Criminal Law states, in its entirety:
Where a unit commits any of the crimes mentioned in the Articles from 213
through 219 of this Section, it shall be fined, and the persons who are directly
in charge and the other persons who are directly responsible for the crime shall
be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Articles respectively.
Id.
69. BROWN, supra note 64, at 35–37 (discussing that the SPC is an independent judicial authority that does not receive any interference from administrative institutions, indi-
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law, issued first in April 2001 and most recently in December 2004.71
SPC-issued interpretive administrative orders function in Chinese law
like legislation.72
The SPC’s 2001 judicial interpretation of the criminal law defined the
thresholds for a punishable copyright crime at a virtually unattainable
level and penalized infringers with minimal fines.73 That infringers were
undeterred from their acts is an understatement—enforcement remained
severely deficient. Days after an infringing factory was fined and shut
down it would reopen.74 Weeks after a raid confiscating hundreds of
DVDs, perpetrators would pop-up at a different store in Beijing.75 And in
2003 only three cases were filed under criminal provisions (as compared
to a mere nineteen criminal cases in 2002, which resulted in sentences
ranging from six months to six years imprisonment).76 Not surprisingly,
China is routinely cited on the USTR Priority Watch List77 and on the
radar of other concerned countries that anticipated sustained detriments
to their own copyright industries.
China’s attempt to better protect copyright—and thwart retaliation by
its trading partners—culminated in its enactment in December 2004 of a
new judicial interpretation (JI) of the criminal law pertaining to IPR in-

viduals, or public organizations; it is responsible for administrating courts, interpreting
the laws, adjudicating cases, and participating in lawmaking).
70. A judicial interpretation is an interpretation of the law issued by a judicial organ
and viewed by government and Party officials to have the same bearing as a traditional
administrative order. Id. at 37 n.167.
71. Criminal codes are enforced in dual part by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate
(SPP), which heads the prosecution system and has the ability to initiate criminal cases
under the Law of Criminal Procedure, and the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), an independent judicial authority that issues judicial interpretations of the law. Id. at 8–10, 25–
27.
72. Id. at 67–68 (explaining that SPC orders are the function of a judicial organ of the
NPC. The NPC is made up of three bodies including the SPP and the SPC.).
73. Special 301 Report, supra note 6.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.; [Interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate on Several Issues of Application of Laws When Hearing the Criminal
Cases of Infringing on the Intellectual Property Rights] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. and the Sup. People’s Proc., Dec. 21, 2004, effective Dec. 22, 2004), arts. 5–6,
14, translated in ISINOLAW (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter Judicial
Interpretation].
77. Yu, supra note 3, at 131–39 (explaining the cycle where the United States would
put China on its “watch-list,” make threats of sanctions to bully it into making laws that
would change its IPR, ultimately do nothing, and then put China on the priority list
again).
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fringement.78 The new JI redefines its key terms to more adequately meet
the demands both of the WTO—particularly Articles 41 and 61 of
TRIPS—and of “offended” countries.79
Ostensibly, the 2004 JI would make it easier for China to prosecute
copyright infringers by lowering monetary thresholds and recalculating
the value of illegal gains necessary to trigger pirate prosecution.80 Specifically, the JI redefines “relatively large illegal gains” as a profit greater
than RMB 30,000 (US$3,710) and “huge illegal gains” as a profit more
than RMB 150,000 (US$18,552).81 The value gained is calculated based
upon the selling price, not on the price of real goods for the products.82
Similarly, the JI lowers the volume of infringing products that a pirate
may sell before he is subject to prosecution.83 It is considered a “serious
circumstance” when an individual reproduces and distributes at least
1,000 illegal copies of a motion picture without the permission of the
copyright owner and an “especially serious circumstance” where an individual reproduces and distributes at least 5,000 copies of the motion picture.84 Other “serious circumstances” include instances where the illegal
business volume exceeds RMB 50,000 (US$6,326) and other “especially
serious circumstances” include where the illegal business volume exceeds RMB 250,000 (US$31,632).85 Perhaps one of the most significant
changes in the JI is the alteration of the rules pertaining to “units” committing a crime. The JI elevates the punishment level for units to a rate of
three times that prescribed for an individual pirate, compared to the previous JI which assigned trivial punishments for group actions.86
C. China’s Compliance with TRIPS
The USTR and IIPA are famous for issuing reports that insist that if
only China would change its laws or if only China would follow the
TRIPS agreement, piracy would be eradicated—or at least greatly dimin-

78. Judicial Interpretation, supra note 76.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Currency conversion computations made using The Universal Currency Converter, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi (last visited Oct. 23, 2006). For the text of the
Judicial Interpretation, see Judicial Interpretation, supra note 76, arts. 5–6, 14.
82. Wu Jing, China Lowers the Conviction Criteria of IPR Violation, People’s Daily
Online (P.R.C.), Dec. 23, 2004, available at http://english.people.com.cn/200412/23/
eng20041223_168430.html.
83. Judicial Interpretation, supra note 76.
84. Id.
85. Id. arts. 5–6.
86. Id. art. 15. See China Pirates Conjure Fake Potter, supra note 10.
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ished—in that country.87 This section will demonstrate that the new JI is
even more closely aligned with the major standards regarding copyright
infringement set out in Articles 41 and 61 of TRIPS than its predecessors. Yet, since the adoption of the JI, the rate of copyright infringement
in China has neither seen the radical decrease once predicted,88 nor is one
anticipated.89 This section will then demonstrate why apparent ambiguities and weaknesses inherent throughout the TRIPS Agreement are to
blame for this failure.
Under Article 41(1) of TRIPS, Member States are required to incorporate enforcement procedures that “permit effective action against any act
of infringement of intellectual property right covered by [the TRIPS]
agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements”90 into
their laws. In other words, each Member must allow its courts to “issue
injunctions, award compensatory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees,
allow the recovery of profits; and order the uncompensated seizure and
disposition of infringing goods.”91
An examination of China’s current policies shows that the country has
implemented measures to comply with these requirements. In 1996 a
new court was established expressly to hear IP cases.92 In 2004, as a result of 573 raids, 145 shops selling pirated DVDs were closed and 510
were fined.93 Also in 2004, over 22 million DVDs were seized, 34 cases
were commenced, 30 indictments were made, and 21 cases resulted in

87. Special 301 Report, supra note 6. See also Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intell. Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm. (2005) (statement of
Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA) (explaining that the IIPA submits annual reports to the
USTR on the piracy of sixty-seven countries, including China, and detailing some of the
reasons for piracy’s breadth); International Intellectual Property Alliance: About IIPA,
http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
88. Various IIPA and USTR documents and reviews of China audaciously proclaim
that if China would accede to the TRIPS agreement and follow it more closely all would
be solved with the problem of piracy, but this Note’s analysis indicates that may not be
so. International Intellectual Property Alliance: About IIPA, supra note 87; OFFICE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REP., OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW ON CHINA, (2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/2005_Special_
301/asset_upload_file835_7647.pdf [hereinafter USTR Out-of-Cycle Review].
89. See Chris Buckley, On Piracy, An Advocate for China’s Progress, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Oct. 4, 2005.
90. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 41(1).
91. Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on
TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT’L. L. 441, 461 (1997) (citations omitted).
92. Jiang Zhipei Address, supra note 60.
93. Special 301 Report, supra note 6, at 196.
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jail time.94 Despite these successes, the IIPA placed China on its Priority
Watch List and charged that China has not met its TRIPS commitment to
provide effective criminal enforcement against piracy and is at fault for
not exhibiting the “political will” needed to bring about such changes.95
It is true that China has not yet efficiently and effectively refined its
mechanisms for preventing and punishing piracy. However, this is not
inconceivable considering that the ambiguities and loopholes encompassed by Article 41(5) suggest that the objectives set out in Article
41(1) need not be enforced in their entirety.96 The effect, in whole, is that
the potential benefits of “international IPR enforcement cannot be realized on a global scale.”97 Article 41(5) enunciates that it does not create
any obligations on Member States to implement a new judicial system
for the enforcement of IPR nor does it oblige Members to expend extra
resources on IPR enforcement.98 Thus, developing countries whose legal
systems are not adapted to such regulations are weak protectors of IPR.
For example, the judicial system China implemented for IP cases is not
yet very effective.99 Because Article 41(5) does not create any obligations with respect to the distribution of resources, China is not required
to put forth more resources toward IPR than it does to the enforcement of
law in general.100 As a result, China may uphold its existing law enforcement mechanisms, no matter how inadequate they are. Thus, the

94. Id. at 200. This data was estimated by the IIPA; China has not officially released
its own data in this matter. The Bush administration, along with Japan and Switzerland,
has demanded that China share information regarding the enforcement of IPR by January
23, 2006. Edward Alden, U.S. to Press China on Moves Against Piracy, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at 11.
95. Special 301 Report, supra note 6; USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, supra note 88.
96. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 327; Jishnu Guha, Time for India’s Intellectual Property Regime to Grow Up, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 225, 237 (2005).
97. Jishnu Guha, supra note 96, at 253.
98. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 41(5).
99. See Jiang Zhipei Address, supra note 60.
100. Christian L. Broadbent & Amanda M. McMillian, Russia and the World Trade
Organization: Will TRIPS be a Stumbling Block to Accession?, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L.
L. 519, 546 (1998). This article narrowly interprets TRIPS Article 41(5) to mean that:
Members are not required to put in place a system of judicial enforcement entirely distinct from that State’s already existing court system. However, the
language that emphasizes a Member State’s autonomy in distributing resources
between intellectual property enforcement and general enforcement may have a
significant impact in countries like Russia where the government has limited
resources to dedicate to enforcement of intellectual property laws.
Id.
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police force, stymied by bribery and inadequate training, is incapable of
curbing piracy and would be even if China had the most sophisticated
system of laws.101
The USTR and IIPA fault China as having weak law enforcement
mechanisms.102 They call on China to increase fines for IPR infringement. They promote the idea of transparency by requesting that China
make public IPR-related case rulings and statistics.103 And they demand
that China “[m]ake administrative IPR enforcement actions deterrent.”104
However, these demands reach beyond the scope of the TRIPS Agreement, no matter how helpful they would be to foreign nations. TRIPS
does not require a country to make fundamental changes to its national
legal system105—yet insisting that China make its case decisions public
and change its enforcement actions would be such a fundamental change.
Ironically, the drafters envisioned the ambiguous language in Article
41 as a safety valve to ensure TRIPS was unanimously accepted by the
Member States.106 The provisions allowed for broader interpretations,
accounted for limited resources in developing countries, and avoided the
requirement that each country develop a new judicial system.107 Instead,
the ability to broadly interpret the agreement is easily exploited by member nations eager to find any excuse not to fully enforce TRIPS. The effect is that in Member States, measures are implemented “only as far as
normally available judicial or administrative resources are available.”108
D. The Impact of TRIPS’ Inadequacies on China’s IPR Law and
Enforcement
Admittedly, the JI is not perfect. Current provisions that require a
profit motive before criminalizing behavior and that provide weak punishments for accomplices must be amended in order for China to vigor-

101. See e.g., Pesek, supra note 6.
102. USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, supra note 88; Piracy of Intellectual Property:
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Intell. Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm. (2005) (statement of Eric H. Smith, President, IIPA).
103. Id. The USTR report explains that China refuses to give information to foreign
governments about the severity of punishments given to pirates or what happens to goods
confiscated during raids.
104. Id.
105. Survey, supra note 31, at x–xi.
106. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 287 (explaining that Article 41(5) addresses the
“stumbling blocks” of negotiation dealing with conflicting legal systems and differing
levels of available resources among the countries).
107. Id. at 287–89.
108. Id. at 289.
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ously target pirates.109 But analyzed objectively as a country whose legal
system is still developing, Chinese laws reflect the requirements set out
in TRIPS to a remarkable degree.110 Even the United States, in the 2005
USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, acknowledged that, under the leadership of
Vice Premier Wu Yi, China has made significant strides in the arena of
protecting IPR.111 So, instead of faulting China’s legal system, international focus should turn to the real reason China’s laws are not having
the immediate impacts desired by the United States and other foreign
countries: the inadequacies of the TRIPS Agreement.
Despite China making changes to and enacting its own laws to meet
the standards enunciated in TRIPS standards,112 the USTR has determined several years in a row that China has failed to adequately protect
IPR. And in early 2005, China was officially placed on the USTR Priority Watch List because of universal concern that China is not in compliance with its WTO/TRIPS obligations and is not actually on the road to
adequately protect IPR.113 China’s failure to significantly reduce the incidence of IPR violations is largely a consequence of the TRIPS Agreement’s failure to address issues such as the provision of resources for
enforcement and fundamental changes to national legal systems.114 And
as a result, China’s Judicial Interpretation of its criminal laws regarding
IPR, although created to comply with TRIPS, cannot adequately succeed
in producing significant decreases in copyright infringement.115
From the perspective of Chinese lawmakers, the enactment of a new JI
regarding the criminalization of IPR infringement was a bold step in the

109. See id.
110. See infra note 61; MERTHA, supra note 16, passim.
111. USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, supra note 88, at 1.
112. See infra Part III.C.
113. USTR Out-of-Cycle Review, supra note 88 (explaining that once a country is
placed on the Priority Watch List it is subject to a special yearly review. The 2005 review
concluded that China has not done enough to curb piracy and must continue to change its
practices of implementing its IPR laws.).
114. See Survey, supra note 31, at xi.
115. Teng, supra note 12 (reporting that the Special 301 Report Card found that, in
2003, 85 percent of DVDs manufactured in China were pirated, as were 69 percent of
VCDs. Further, it was reported that the Special 301 report estimated that in 2004 U.S.
industries lost $2.5 billion to piracy in China. Overall piracy rates hover around 90 percent in China.); FENG, supra note 62, at 140 (explaining that in the January 1995 Judicial
Interpretation, criminal sanctions would be imposed for “illegal sales exceeding RMB
100,000 for individuals and RMB 500,000 for units.” Additionally, the 1995 interpretation considered factors such as a previous record of criminal copyright infringement or
political and social consequences. The current interpretation does not take these factors
into consideration.).
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pursuit of judicial reform.116 In fact, in the self-proclaimed era of “Justice
and Efficiency,”117 which seeks to provide “effective protection for the
legal interests of IP rights holders, promot[e] the prosperity and development of science, technology and culture, [help] to regulate the economic order of the market and [improve] the investment environment,”118
the JI would be the effort’s pinnacle.
In theory, it is a bold step forward. For decades, outsiders perceived
China as having a moral void in the realm of IPR.119 The JI, in contrast,
serves as a guide to judges, a tool to educate the public, and a promise to
the international community to provide more effective protection.120 But
in practice, the mechanisms to enforce such a bold plan are limited. The
country faces challenges more serious than IP and therefore cannot focus
its monetary resources on the problem.121 Further, customs agents are
easily bribed to allow pirates to import and export pirated goods.122 The
police force, relied upon to implement and enforce the law, does not have
enough money in its budget to enforce the law or to properly train its
officers in regard to IPR.123 And combined with the drafters’ failure to
maintain TRIPS as an agreement capable of placing adequate pressure on
a country to strengthen its IPR enforcement—or their failure to foresee
the necessity of doing this—the ultimate result is that China will continue to move at a slow, but steady pace toward its goal of curbing piracy.124
116. See Jiang Zhipei Address, supra note 60.
117. Id. In his speech regarding recent developments in China’s judicial protection of
IPR, Zhipei stated:
Since China’s entry into WTO, reform in China has reached a new stage and
the judicial reform of the Courts has been carried out even further. “Justice and
Efficiency” has been declared the theme of the judicial system in the 21st century and a well-focused movement to make Chinese judges more professional
has been put on the schedule. All of these measures have created a sound situation at home and abroad for the Court to carry out the difficult mission of IP
law enforcement in China. I am confident that IP law enforcement will become
ever more just and efficient.
Id.
118. Jiang Zhipei is a Member of the Judicial Committee of the Supreme People’s
Court and has been involved in the formulation of legislation of intellectual property law
in China. Id.
119. See generally ALFORD, supra note 3.
120. Buckley, supra note 89.
121. Id.
122. Faison, supra note 5.
123. Pesek, supra note 6; Special 301 Report, supra note 6.
124. Buckley, supra note 89.
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IV. SOLUTION: PUTTING THE WTO BACK ON TRACK
And so, more than a decade after joining the WTO, piracy in China has
not been significantly reduced. But the onus for change cannot be placed
upon China—or comparable countries—alone. First, TRIPS does not
provide mechanisms for harmonization,125 which means that every country can choose its own method to cope with piracy and its WTO responsibilities. The result if every developing country did this, however, would
be a jumble of rules and regulations. Second, China is doing all that it
can—at this moment—to enforce IPR. As discussed in Part III, China
has already developed a new court system and changed its laws to comply with TRIPS.126 Further, China is working hard to educate government
officials, as well as lawyers, businessmen, and trademark agents, about
IP protection and laws at the Intellectual Property Training Center in
Beijing which opened in January 1997.127 The onus, instead, must be
placed on the WTO itself to stimulate change.128
But the ideas of imposing sanctions or filing an official complaint at
the WTO, which have been advocated—or at least threatened—by the
MPAA, IIPA, and USTR, are not certain to be viable options either.129
This form of WTO action would likely embarrass China, rather than acknowledging and applauding the great strides it has already made.130
Such action would set China up for more criticism from other countries
and possibly alienate it.131 Consequently, other developing countries
would be deterred from changing their own laws to conform to IPR
norms. As any grade school teacher knows, ambiguously defined rules
lead to disorder in the classroom. Students who fully understood the reasons behind the rules their teachers impose and who have a say in the

125. A harmonization mechanism would provide a basic structure to which each member state must conform its rules. GEORGE A. BERMANN & ROGER J. GOEBEL ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 536–39 (West Group 2002) (1993).
126. See infra Part III.
127. Yu, supra note 3, at 151–52.
128. Because the WTO is a neutral body with a peaceful mission to promote fair trade,
it is capable of promoting resolutions to these problems. Id. The United States needs to
find a peaceful solution to the IPR problems, rather than imposing sanctions or a WTO
hearing because it relies upon China to keep peace in North Korea and Russia, to fight
terrorism in the Middle East and around the world, and for trade; the United States cannot
afford to alienate China over the issue of piracy. See id.; Wang Jsi, China’s Search for
Stability with America, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2005, available at http://www.
foreignaffaris.org; Swanson, supra note 1.
129. Yu, supra note 3, at 166–70.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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rulemaking, however, are more apt to abide by them.132 Analogously,
China and other similarly situated countries must be held to clear standards. Like students in a classroom, each would benefit from a clear
enunciation of these expectations in the TRIPS Agreement itself, rather
than in subsequent documents produced by the IIPA and USTR to criticize China. Although China has worked to implement criminal laws to
protect IPR, it cannot be expected to meet the stringent expectations of
the United States and organizations like the IIPA when those expectations are expressed ambiguously in TRIPS, the defining document.
Although they did not foresee the specific problems affecting China
today, the drafters of TRIPS did anticipate that with continued growth in
technology, globalization, and potentially unanswered questions in the
agreement itself, there would be an eventual need to amend the Agreement.133 As a result, Article 71 was adopted to provide a mechanism to
review and amend TRIPS. Specifically, it calls for TRIPS to be reviewed
at least every other year or at any time therein that the Council decides
“in the light of any relevant new developments which might warrant
modification or amendment of [the TRIPS] Agreement.”134 It is pivotal
that Article 71 powers be used to tweak the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement to ensure the high quality of Member States’ legal systems
and to adequately stop IPR infringement and punish pirates while maintaining due process.135 Through this process, member nations must—at a
minimum—amend provisions to make the agreement self-executing, revise Article 41’s ambiguities, and ensure that adequate resources are
available to enforce TRIPS.
Member States must assess, via the mechanisms available in Article
71,136 how the provisions of Article 41 can be fine-tuned to ensure every
member’s concerns are met. The current ambiguities, as explained in
Parts II and III, render it nearly impossible for Member States to implement measures to successfully protect IPR. Likewise, it is pertinent that
China and other countries, in the process of changing their own systems,
are key players in this negotiation process. By taking ownership and responsibility, China’s government and citizens will gain a greater understanding of the rules by which they will abide and negotiators can be certain that the measures agreed upon are both practicable and just.
132. FREDRIC H. JONES, PH.D., TOOLS FOR TEACHING passim (Fredric H. Jones & Associates, Inc. 2000).
133. GERVAIS, supra note 20, at 370 (explaining that the review mechanism was included to circumvent the need for another formal discussion forum).
134. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 71.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Further, the TRIPS Agreement must be re-evaluated and amended to
be a self-executing agreement. This would mean that a Member State
could rely on the Agreement alone to set national standards and laws in
order to ensure IPR are protected, rather than requiring Member States or
non-government organizations to make their own pacts with infringing
states. For example, instead of relying upon independent agreements
such as the one made in July 2005 between the Motion Picture Association (MPA), an international organization designed to protect American
films,137 and China, TRIPS itself should provide similarly specific
mechanisms to curb piracy. The MPA-China agreement, for example,
stipulated that the MPA will regularly submit a list of films which will be
screened there in exchange for an agreement that Chinese officials would
seize all illegal copies of the listed movies found on the streets.138 Although this agreement has resulted in a dramatic decrease in the availability of pirated DVDs in China—for example, none of the films listed
on the first submission list were available in Shanghai139—it would be
more efficient if specific legal language was included in TRIPS which
could be applied to all Member States, rather than forcing the motion
picture industry to create separate agreements with infringing nations.
Finally, using its Article 71 power of review, the Council must initiate
the negotiation of a mechanism to provide supplemental resources to
states for the enforcement of TRIPS.140 For example, Member States
could require that parties wishing to pursue an action in court pay a fee to
access the court. This court fee would prevent Member States from using
their lack of resources as an excuse for failing to prosecute IPR infringements.141 A second option would be to require Member States to
pay dues to the WTO. Like the United Nations, the WTO is a treatybased organization and does not have its own revenue sources to keep it
afloat.142 Membership dues—paid on a sliding scale—allow the U.N. to
pursue its mission.143 Similarly, membership dues could enable the WTO
137. Jonathan Landreth, China to Help MPA’s Battle Against Piracy, HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER, July 17, 2005, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com. See Motion
Picture Association, http://www.mpaa.org/piracy_IntLaw.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
138. William Triplett, China Results Mixed in Antipiracy Efforts, DAILY VARIETY, Oct.
26, 2005, at 5.
139. Id. (citing that, as a result of the agreement, the availability of pirated titles fell 50
percent in Beijing during September and fell “sharply” in Guangzhou).
140. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 71.
141. Jiang Zhipei Address, supra note 60.
142. Image and Reality: Questions and Answers about the U.N., http://www.un.org/
geninfo/ir (follow “5. Is the United Nations Good Value for the Money” hyperlink) (last
visited Nov. 6, 2006).
143. Id.
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to distribute resources on an as-needed basis to countries without ample
resources to implement IPR protection mechanisms.144 By amending
TRIPS to include a provision that would provide developing countries
with the extra resources they need to protect IPR, the loopholes invited
by Article 41 and which allow Member States to only enforce IPR to the
extent they have the resources to do so, would be narrowed.145
V. CONCLUSION: ‘HOLLYWOOD’ STRIKES BACK
A. Introduction
Although the MPAA and Hollywood executives are encouraged by the
idea that China has conducted a few investigations into and raids of
fraudulent businesses, the rest of the world nevertheless looks on confused and disgruntled at the slow pace with which change is occurring in
China.146 But perhaps “Hollywood” has the right view—that China is
forging new paths and is coming around to protect IPR, albeit slowly. As
China has begun to recognize the influence of piracy on its own movie
industry, its government has been more apt to acknowledge the idea that
IPR protections are important. As a result, China has become more willing to work with the United States and the WTO to enforce IPR to the
extent it can. But Hollywood—and now the U.S. government—have recognized that complacency is not an option; they must still take the initiative to protect themselves because TRIPS is not currently strong enough
to do it.147
B. Current Efforts to Protect U.S. Business Interests
Although some Hollywood experts might be optimistic about China’s
progress, none can be accused of naiveté. Hollywood executives, the
MPAA, and other organizations have taken their own initiatives to curb
the impact of copyright piracy in China. For example, the MPAA recently filed lawsuits against six hubs for TV show trading because international markets are hurt by reduced demand for syndication and interna144. Id. (explaining that the purpose of collecting membership dues is to enable the
United Nations to follow its mission of providing resources to promote world peace, humanitarian issues, etc.). In the context of the WTO, membership dues would allow nations to pool their resources to then distribute to nations incapable of financing their own
IPR protection mechanisms. Helping poorer nations up-front would ultimately diminish
the amount that nations often pay later to establish other mechanisms to protect IPR when
a country cannot meet the demands of TRIPS because it lacks the resources to do so.
145. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 20, art. 41.
146. Special 301 Report, supra note 6.
147. See supra Part II.
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tional sales when content is stolen.148 In addition, some movie production
companies have asked that movie theater representatives wear night vision goggles during the first weeks of a movie’s release in order to effectively patrol for pirates.149 And at the Spiderman premiere, security was
tighter than the named superhero’s own webs around arch-enemy the
Green Goblin. The studio sent the footage to the theater locked in vaults
and armed with digital tracking codes, and guests were sent through
metal detectors and subject to identification checks in order to prevent
illegal recordings of the movie from being made.150
On an international front, movie production companies, such as Warner Brothers, have experimented with the simultaneous release of movies
in theaters in the United States and on video in China. For example, the
movie Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants, produced by Warner Brothers,
was released in 1,500 stores in China on the same day it was released in
American theaters.151 A Warner Brothers executive described this as “a
way to offer movie buffs legal alternatives to stolen copies.”152 However,
the studio in this case never planned to release this movie in Chinese
theaters, so it is unclear what impact such a strategy would have on box
office sales for movies that are planned for future release in China.153
Another creative approach was taken by the MPA, which sponsored a
merit badge for Boy Scouts in Hong Kong who took a course on international property rights and piracy.154 Even actor Jackie Chan and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, a former actor himself, irate at
lost revenues after their movies’ DVD release, have teamed up to fight
piracy as real-life action heroes in a new public service announcement
aimed at educating China’s citizens about the criminality of piracy.155
148. MPAA Targets TV Download Sites, THE INTERNET NEWSLETTER, June 2005, at 7.
149. High-tech Hunt for Potter Pirates, CNN.com, May 31, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/Movies/05/31/britain.potter/index.html (explaining that such practices have been in effect for at least two years in areas of the United
States where movie piracy is considered a major threat).
150. Healey & Philips, supra note 16.
151. Jonathan Landreth, U.S. Companies Confident Patience Will Pay Off,
HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, July 28, 2005.
152. Warner opens new front in piracy war?, CNN.COM, June 9, 2005, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/09/technology/personaltech/piracy_china.
153. Landreth, supra note 151. Taking this idea one step further, the creators of the
most recent Harry Potter movie opted to release it on the “big screen” in China before its
U.S. release with the hope that “Chinese fans [would] pay for tickets before pirated
DVDs show[ed] up in markets.” Bawa, supra note 10.
154. Pesek, supra note 6. See also Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Intell. Prop. Sen. Judiciary Comm. (2005) (statement of Eric H. Smith,
President, IIPA).
155. Ben Sisario, Fighting Piracy in China, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2005, at B8.
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These creative attempts by the U.S. government and businesses at protecting IPR serve to compliment the efforts by the Chinese government
and other international governments to educate people in China about the
importance of protecting IPR and even about the existence of IPR. However, that these actions are even necessary is a clear signal to the international community that the current standards in TRIPS are not working
and must be changed if they are to work independently from outside
agreements and intervention to protect intellectual property rights.
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